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Assessing Whether Oil 
Dependency in Venezuela 
Contributes to National Instability
Adam Kott
New York University
Introduction
The world is experiencing an unprecedented demand for energy as eco-
nomic development begets rising incomes as well as increased stresses on 
the international marketplace. While petroleum has the potential to help 
meet the challenges of economic development, the international oil mar-
ket is volatile and fragile, and seemingly insignificant changes in oil pro-
duction can have a disproportionately large impact on global prices. Many 
states that are reliant on oil and other nonrenewable resources have fallen 
Abstract
The focus of this article is on what role, if any, oil has on Venezuela's 
instability. When trying to explain why a resource-rich country experi-
ences slow or negative growth, experts often point to the resource curse. 
The following pages explore the traditional theory behind the resource 
curse as well as alternative perspectives to this theory such as ownership 
structure and the correlation between oil prices and democracy. This arti-
cle also explores the various forms of instability within Venezuela and 
their causes. Finally, the article looks at President Hugo Chavez's political 
and economic policies as well as the stagnation of the state oil company, 
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). This article dispels the myth that the 
resource curse is the source of destabilization in many resource depen-
dent countries. Rather than a cause of instability, this phenomenon is a 
symptom of a much larger problem that is largely structural.
Kott: Assessing Whether Oil Dependency in Venezuela Contributes to Nati
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012Journal of Strategic Security
70
victim to the resource curse. Venezuela faces the various attributes of the 
resource curse, including an unstable economy, the rise of an authoritar-
ian government, Dutch Disease, and corruption.
The Economic Perspective
Volatility and the Boom-Bust Cycle
Over-reliance on a single commodity for a majority of a nation's export 
revenue is an especially precarious prospect. Over-reliant countries put 
their fate in the hands of a capricious global commodity market that regu-
larly cycles through booms and busts. In the case of oil, prices have 
shifted as much as 70 percent in a year's time. The boom-bust culture pre-
sents many problems to countries reliant on a single export or two for a 
majority of their revenue. When prices are high, the opportunity cost of 
investing in another good for export becomes extremely great. Capital and 
labor shifts toward one product may have short-term benefits, but this 
creates an economic monoculture. A country with an economic monocul-
ture, such the case of Venezuela and oil, will experience considerable eco-
nomic hardships when the price of the commodity falls. For instance, the 
price of oil decreased from $140/barrel to $40/barrel between 2008 and 
2009. During this same time period, Venezuela experienced a negative 
3.2 percent GDP growth rate due largely to the sudden shortage of export 
revenues, which declined from $93.5 billion to $57.6 billion.1
Boom-bust cycles also lead to poor governmental expenditure decisions. 
Overspending during good years and deep budget cuts during bad years 
have far reaching impacts. Renowned economist Jeffrey Sachs notes, "the 
benefits in the good years are transitory while the problems generated 
during the bad years endure."2 For instance, in 2009 Hugo Chavez 
slashed 33 percent of the national budget after oil traded well below what 
the Venezuelan Government initially projected.3 Poor financial decisions 
can often have international repercussions. During commodity booms, 
countries often borrow against future earnings from various international 
lenders. A prolonged drop in prices, however, may make it impossible for 
these countries to pay loans back, subsequently forcing the borrower to 
default or become mired in a deep debt crisis.
Dutch Disease
Dutch Disease is another common trait seen in countries reliant on natu-
ral resource exports. The term "Dutch Disease" was first coined in 1977 by 
the Economist to describe the economic impact of natural gas exports in 
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the Netherlands. Following the discovery of natural gas in the Black Sea in 
the 1970s, the Dutch manufacturing sector began to experience a signifi-
cant decline. Essentially, local currency appreciates as a result of high 
demands for a given commodity. The influx of money into the local econ-
omy due to high-value exports causes demand and, consequently, prices 
to increase. As a result, local currency appreciates and there is an increase 
of the real exchange rate. With such an overvalued domestic currency, 
other domestic products such as manufactured and agricultural goods 
become overpriced and uncompetitive in the global market. This in turn 
also contributes to what is often called the "resource pull effect."4
A dominant natural resource sector attracts a majority of the domestic 
capital and often becomes the wage-setter, with wages higher than the 
struggling domestic industries. While some labor shifts towards this natu-
ral resource sector cause layoffs in the now less competitive manufactur-
ing and agricultural sectors, many nonrenewable resource industries are 
not labor intensive. For instance, mining rare minerals may require a 
large employee base, but oil and natural gas production is primarily a 
technology and capital-intensive process needing fewer workers. This 
results in high unemployment rates in petroleum dependent economies 
that do not have a viable manufacturing or agricultural base. In addition 
to a shifting work force, natural resource domination threatens to crowd-
out entrepreneurial activity and innovation, especially if this industry is 
the wage-setter, as workers may be more inclined to work in the resource 
sector rather than create their own businesses.5 Overall, Dutch Disease 
creates a vicious cycle that gives primacy to a single sector and helps rein-
force the natural resource monoculture.
The Political Perspective
Resource Rents
A handful of political issues appear in countries that rely on nonrenew-
able natural resources. Most of them are directly tied to rent-seeking 
behavior. An "economic rent" is the gap that "exists between the value of 
that resource and the costs of extracting it."6 In the case of resources such 
as oil and natural gas, the commodities' market value far exceeds the cost 
of production. In these countries, those in control have an inordinate 
amount of power due to their access to resource rents. Sachs and his co-
authors acknowledge that "politicians with an uncertain hold on power 
have an incentive to spend sooner rather than to leave opportunities on 
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the table for future political opponents."7 Premature spending can lead to 
economic woes such as the shortage of funds during times of low com-
modity prices. This trend plays out in the political sphere.
Authoritarianism, Accountability, and Cronyism
Analysts find that governments in resource rich nations tend to be more 
authoritarian than their non-resource dependent counterparts.8 Thomas 
Friedman's First Law of Petropolitics notes, "the price of oil and the pace 
of freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petrolist 
states."9 Politicians, for instance, are motivated to remain in office 
because resource rents offer them power and wealth. Those in power may 
use resource rents to "successfully repress or co-opt their oppositions, and 
thus avoid having to relinquish power through electoral competition."10 
Resource rents are not always used in an overtly repressive manner; how-
ever, politicians will freely use resource rents to help fund campaigns, sys-
tematically outspending their opponents to victory. Furthermore, the 
governments of resource-rich nations are often unaccountable to the peo-
ple. Part of this is directly tied to authoritarianism, as politicians will use 
resources rents to oppress the opposition or to ensure victory through 
neo-patrimonialism. Alternatively, resource rents often replace taxation 
as the main source of government revenue. In a country with a tax system 
and an electoral process, the government is held accountable by the elec-
torate and must use tax revenues to support the economy and develop 
social programs. A non-existent tax system will often translate to weak 
linkages between the government and its people. The government will 
have little or no incentive to work for the people if it is not reliant on them 
for revenues. As Michael Ross states in his work Does Taxation Lead to 
Representation?, "the need to collect taxes is widely thought to have con-
tributed to the emergence of strong states and even democratic institu-
tions in many Western countries."11
Resource rents promote a system of corruption and cronyism. Political 
scientists have found that rents promote patronage links, most notably in 
countries that were politically weak prior to the discovery of the resource. 
This may help explain why Norway and Botswana have been able to avoid 
political corruption while most others have not.12, 13 This trend is espe-
cially prevalent in Africa where colonialism left behind the legacy of a 
strong patronage network. Resource rents are zero-sum; one person's 
gain is another's loss. As a result of this reality, resource-rich countries 
often have vertical linkage systems: "To get ahead individuals look 
upwards to get access to a piece of the oil rent, and compete against, 
rather than collaborate with fellow citizens."14 This differs greatly from 
countries without resource rents and more well rounded economies. In 
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these places, citizens must collaborate horizontally to build networks in 
order to get ahead, whether that means forging unions to secure work-
place rights or building trade ties with other companies.
Further cementing the concept of resource rents being a zero-sum game, 
the Financial Times noted that, "in a society when everyone cheats and 
takes or pays bribes, there is little incentive not to join in."15 In resource 
rich countries, rent-seeking behavior is seen at the highest levels. Count-
less heads of state have been charged with siphoning state funds towards 
private, international bank accounts. One example is President Omar al-
Bashir of Sudan, who is suspected of funneling $9 billion dollars of oil 
profits abroad.16 Those who do not directly steal from the state will often 
set up a neo-patrimonial network in which their closest friends, family, or 
companions are placed in the highest governmental roles so that they may 
benefit from the power and money that resource rents bring. Cronyism is 
almost inevitable in resource-rich countries, for "resource rents are con-
centrated and (in some cases) easily appropriable, government officials in 
such countries are tempted into rent-seeking and possible corruption 
rather than pro-growth activities."17 Sudan's president has used the cli-
ent-patron relationship to secure power for 25 years. Al-Bashir created 
the country's legislature and appointed his party-mates to 450 of the 500 
seats, securing them federal employment at a time when the national 
economy was contracting by nearly 4 percent. Al-Bashir also made sure to 
appease the national army, the group most responsible for national inse-
curity since its independence. He has more than tripled Sudan's yearly 
military expenditure since he took power in 1989. Today this number 
stands at just under $2 billion a year and looks to only be rising.18 The 
Sudanese President has essentially been able to fund the military by 
directing 60 percent of Sudan's oil revenues toward it.19
Alternative Perspectives of the Resource Curse
Ownership Structure
Not every country that relies on resource exports experiences instability. 
Perhaps the most well known alternative to the traditional resource curse 
theory focuses on the structure of ownership rather than the mineral 
wealth itself. In Oil Is Not a Curse, Pauline Jones Luong and Erika 
Weinthal point out that ownership structure is not constant but rather a 
variable, and that "which form of ownership structure a country adopts is 
arguably the first and the most important choice that mineral-rich states 
make because it shapes incentives for subsequent institution building."20 
Jones Luong and Weinthal examine the Commonwealth of Independent 
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States (CIS) following the collapse of the Soviet Union in their work. 
These countries' various ownership structures played a large role in how 
their political, economic, and social spheres looked a decade later. Those 
that chose to engage in a state ownership experienced "bloated public sec-
tors, high levels of indebtedness and overzealous spending."21 Other CIS 
countries that chose private domestic and private foreign ownership were 
able to shrink the public sector and control government spending in spite 
of an oil boom in the first few years of the new millennium. Overall, Jones 
Luong and Weinthal discovered that petroleum rich CIS countries outper-
formed the poorer petroleum nations in both social and business environ-
ment indicators.
When looking at ownership structure, transaction costs and societal 
expectations play a large role in the health of the State. Transaction costs 
often impact the main actors' incentives to create strong versus weak fis-
cal regimes.22 Jones Luong and Weinthal theorize that countries with 
state ownership structures suffer because transaction costs are low and 
main actors are incentivized to manage the mineral sector with discretion. 
This, in turn, creates weak fiscal regimes as corruption becomes prevalent 
and discourages smart economic policies such as the creation of a natural 
resource fund. Alternatively, a private ownership structure has high 
transaction costs because the main actors have divergent interests. Coun-
tries in which resources are managed by state-owned enterprises are often 
hampered by societal expectations, as the State "owes its status as direct 
claimant to its role as society's agent."23 As many states commit them-
selves to managing wealth in society's best interest, governments use nat-
ural resource revenues as their personal "piggy bank" via mass spending, 
subsidies, and "white elephant projects" whose cost disproportionately 
outweighs its usefulness or worth. Under a private ownership structure, 
society does not feel entitled to the distribution of resource rents. Further-
more, since resource wealth can only be gathered by the State through 
taxation of the private ownership, society is incentivized to support a via-
ble taxation system.
Resource Wealth and the Promotion of Democracy
While the concept of ownership structures may be the most predominant 
counter-argument to the classical resource curse theory, it is not the only 
one. Another school of thought posits that resource revenues can actually 
promote democracy. Thad Dunning argues that resource rents "reduce 
the extent to which democratic majorities redistribute private income or 
wealth away from the rich elites through taxation, land reform, or other 
measures."24 Thus, high resource prices allow states to redistribute rents 
throughout society. This takes pressure off of the nation's elite to act as 
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the "load-bearers" for national revenue and acts as a disincentive to stage 
a coup against the government. Dunning explores Venezuela's relation-
ship with oil in Crude Democracy. In this work he notes a positive rela-
tionship between oil rents and democratic stability in the South American 
nation, pointing to a "degree of class 'compromise' and 'consensus' that 
was highly unusual in Latin American countries during this period."25 Oil 
rents allowed the State to increase spending on education and health by 
twenty and five times respectively, all without placing a heavy tax burden 
on the country's elite.
The Causes of Instability
This section explores instability in Venezuela within political and eco-
nomic dimensions. Each example of instability is complemented with a 
cause. These causes fall into one of two overarching themes: 1) the role of 
Hugo Chavez, and 2) the stagnation of PDVSA. Political and social groups 
in Venezuela, along with misguided economic policies, have effectively 
"crowded out" democracy and caused instability under Hugo Chavez. 
Additionally, a structurally unsound PDVSA has had damaging impacts 
on the Latin American nation. While many claim that the resource curse 
is destabilizing Venezuela, the resource curse is really a symptom of the 
problem rather than the cause.
Economic Instability
In spite of Venezuela's vast oil wealth, the country faces a great deal of 
economic instability. The most noticeable and damaging economic mal-
ady is inflation. Venezuela has the highest inflation rate in the world, a 
staggering 28.9 percent.26 In fact, purchasing power has decreased by 15 
percent since 2003, meaning citizens can now buy 15 percent less than 
they could in 1998.27 According to the Index of Economic Freedom:
"Venezuela continues to be mired in a climate of economic 
repression. Severely hampered by state interference, the formal 
economy is increasingly stagnant, and informal economic activity 
is expanding. Monetary stability is particularly weak, and there 
are extensive price controls on almost all goods and services. 
Government interference in the financial sector further distorts 
price levels and constrains private-sector growth by allocating 
credit on non-market terms."28
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Another dangerous aspect of the Venezuelan economy is that both domes-
tic and foreign business within the country is increasingly scarce. A World 
Bank analysis posits that there are only six countries in the world where it 
is worse to do business.29 In fact, Venezuela is ranked one of the top two 
worst places in the world to get credit, pay taxes, or receive investor pro-
tection.30 Furthermore, many international investors have refrained from 
entering the Venezuelan market due to Chavez's unpredictable nature. 
Since his first election in 1999, Chavez has nationalized part or all of the 
oil, cement, steel, gold, and rice industries. The result of these national-
izations remains largely a mystery, as the government routinely releases 
economic data with little transparency. Overall, the country's economy is 
beginning to feel the crunch of economic mismanagement. Since 2007, 
direct foreign investment in Venezuela has decreased from $44 billion to 
$37.6 billion, a 14.5 percent drop.31 As Chavez continues to nationalize 
industries and the government maintains intrusive policies, foreign 
investment in Venezuela will continue to languish.
While many resource-rich nations have turned to sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) to help manage their resource rents, Venezuela has largely turned 
a blind eye to the economic precaution. SWFs help prevent the local cur-
rency from appreciating and act as a "rainy day fund" to help bolster the 
economy of a resource-rich country when commodity prices are low. Oil is 
responsible for nearly 95 percent of Venezuela's export revenue, which 
between 1999 and 2010 totaled over $510 billion. Despite this great num-
ber, the country's SWF is valued at less than 1 percent of this total, at a 
mere $800 million. This pales in comparison to Norway, who has put 
over $560 billion in an SWF fund thanks to nearly $1 trillion worth of 
exports over the same time period. According to the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute, Chavez has nearly complete control over his country's 
SWF, as he appoints the SWF's leadership and the country's legislature 
has "limited involvement with any decision-making regarding the fund, 
nor does it have an oversight role."32 Over the last decade, Venezuela has 
become a heavily statist regime with severe regulatory restrictions and lit-
tle history of private sector growth. The petroleum monoculture exacer-
bated the country's economic woes when facing the 2008 global financial 
crisis. As a result of the crisis, Venezuela witnessed local debts rise, infla-
tion, exchange rate distortions, consumer good shortages, and the flight 
of foreign direct investment.33 The Chavez government failed to pass any 
serious austerity measures, as spending cuts would adversely impact his 
vital support base, the country's lowest classes.
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Political Instability
Venezuela is not politically instable in the traditional sense. The country 
has regular elections that are contested by various political parties. How-
ever, the structure is currently one of political asymmetry that encourages 
either co-option or incendiary political rhetoric.
Various indices rate the country among the world's worst in terms of 
political freedoms. The Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) 2011 
Democracy Index ranks Venezuela 97th after taking into account factors 
such as the electoral process, political participation, and civil liberties. 
EIU also rates Venezuela "the worst offender" after Cuba in terms of 
freedom of the media.34 Reporters Without Borders backs up this 
sentiment, ranking Venezuela 117th in the world in their 2011/2012 Press 
Freedoms Index. Tied with Venezuela are a handful of other nations 
rarely lauded for their freedoms: Cambodia, Fiji, Oman, and Zimbabwe. 
Nearly every index shows that political freedoms in Venezuela have 
declined over the past decade. Freedom House's Freedom in the World 
2012 is just another example: Venezuela scores a 5 in both political rights 
and civil liberties. This ranking is down from 1999, when it scored a 4 in 
both categories.35, 36 Though Freedom House may have designated 
Venezuela "partly free" before Chavez entered office, the historical 
rankings show that the country has slipped even further during his 
presidency. Lastly, and perhaps most stark, is Transparency 
International's Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures the 
"perceived levels of public sector corruption." In 2011, Venezuela ranked 
172nd, with only nine nations designated as more corrupt.37
The Chavez Administration is best described as a hybrid regime, a "politi-
cal system in which the mechanism for determining access to state office 
combines both democratic and autocratic practices."38 A hybrid regime is 
one in which the government rarely negotiates with opposition forces, the 
State undermines the autonomy of civic institutions, and loyalists of the 
government are put in the highest offices, helping to undermine the sys-
tem of checks and balances. Chavez came to power following an era of 
extremely uneven growth in Venezuela. In the decade before his presi-
dency, Venezuela experienced a growth rate of less than 1 percent six 
times.39 Chavez was able to capitalize off the anti-establishment senti-
ments caused by the country's poor economic performance and created a 
"hyper presidential" constitution. He was able to manipulate the electoral 
process to "enable the government, with only 53 percent of the votes, to 
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obtain control of 93 percent of the seats."40 Lastly, Chavez altered the 
structure of the country's Supreme Court, ensuring that the judiciary 
would make chavismo-inspired rulings by adding twelve of his close allies 
to the bench. Overall, since Chavez has come to power the political atmo-
sphere in Venezuela has transformed from one of "heightened power 
competition to…power asymmetry."41
The various measures that Chavez took to secure power and stack the gov-
ernment with allies greatly alienated the opposition and caused his politi-
cal enemies to become more extreme in the eyes of the people. Political 
losses have forced the opposition to become even more polarized. In the 
face of increasingly undemocratic political moves, opposition parties boy-
cotted legislative and presidential elections. Unfortunately, this worked to 
their own detriment, as Chavez and his party, Partido Socialistia Unido de 
Venezuela (PSUV), were able to secure more power.
One way that Chavez maintains such great control over his country is 
through the utilization of resource rents for personal and political gain. A 
key aspect to chavismo is "placing state resources and security services at 
the disposal of the ruling party while denying them to its rivals."42 Oppo-
sition members who have grown tired of fighting the status quo have been 
co-opted by the government. Furthermore, Venezuela has become an 
increasingly undemocratic state: The government has shut down opposi-
tion media, jailed opposition leaders and been charged with election tam-
pering on numerous occasions. Unfortunately for the people of 
Venezuela, today's majority coalition is not motivated by democratic 
gains but rather personal power and economic benefit.
The Stagnation of PDVSA
Venezuela has benefited in some ways over the past few years from boom-
ing oil prices. From 2004–2011, the lowest annual price of oil was still 
higher than that of the previous twenty years. Despite these high prices, 
the country remains weak across various political, economic, and social 
indicators. The stagnation of the parastatal oil company, PDVSA, is par-
tially responsible for the country's woes. PDVSA has been poorly man-
aged, both in terms of who it employs and its relationship with the Chavez 
administration. Had it been under better care for the past decade, the 
company would not currently face the strain of weakened infrastructure. 
This would have lead to greater oil revenues that could have been used to 
weather unfavorable economic conditions that may arise in the future.
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Oil Strike of 2002–2003
In December 2002, mid- and high-level managers, operational staff, and 
shipping captains in PDVSA brought the company to a standstill in a 
movement against Hugo Chavez. The economic effects of the strike were 
grave. In the first quarter of 2003, the country's GDP contracted by 27 
percent. Venezuela was forced to import oil to meet domestic demand and 
unemployment increased by a third, growing to 20.3 percent.43 When the 
strike eventually ended, Chavez replaced the company's board of directors 
with political allies and merged the company with the Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum, which assured the President would have a hands-on rela-
tionship with the national oil company. He then fired nearly 18,000 
employees in a wide-ranging move: Exploration and well engineers, 
human resources staff, and members of finance, maintenance, and mar-
keting.44 This move would cause a "brain drain" in PDVSA for years to 
come. The company suffered a "loss of human capital that was seen as the 
best trained and most experienced staff of any oil company in a develop-
ing country."45
Social Investment
PDVSA, despite the mass firings, still manages to bring in hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars in revenue due to high oil prices and the country's vast 
reserves. Much of these revenues, however, have not gone towards rein-
vestment in PDVSA but rather toward social programs such as Fonden, 
Fondespa, and misiones. All of these initiatives, integral parts of Chavez's 
"Bolivarian Revolution," provide aid to the country's lower class via infra-
structure projects, agricultural activities, health care and education. From 
2003–2008, PDVSA spent more than $23 billion on these social pro-
grams.46 Social indicators in Venezuela have improved since PDVSA 
began to focus on social investment. The number of households living in 
poverty has nearly halved to 29 percent and social spending per capita has 
tripled. The social programs have been criticized as being too short-term 
and for not addressing the structural inequalities that are an intrinsic 
problem within the country. Although the people of Venezuela have bene-
fitted from oil revenues, it is impossible to predict what progress could 
have been made had Chavez chosen not to fire 40% of PDVSA's employ-
ees. Had they remained with the company, it may have been able to avoid 
the stagnation it faces today and bring in billions of dollars more.
In spite of some of the progress made as a result of oil revenues, Venezu-
ela faces a number of social issues including violence, energy insecurity, 
and food shortages. Over the past decade, homicides in Venezuela have 
quadrupled. Caracas has a higher murder rate than any other city in the 
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Western Hemisphere other than Ciudad Juarez. Worldwide, the country 
has the fourth highest murder rate; nearly two people are killed every 
hour.47
Despite the country's massive reserves of oil, Venezuela gets 72.8 percent 
of its domestic electricity generation from hydropower.48 Hydropower 
provides many advantages, including clean and generally competitive 
energy prices. However, relying so heavily on this source of electricity has 
greatly hampered Venezuela. Climate change has caused prolonged 
droughts in the region and brought Venezuela's dams to dangerously low 
levels. Over the past few years the government has instituted rolling 
blackouts in order to conserve power. This policy has hurt small and large 
businesses alike. On numerous occasions PDVSA's oil refineries have lost 
power and been forced to shut down. Even temporary hiccups such as this 
can seriously hamper a national economy that is so dependent on one 
good.
In response to inflated consumer prices, Caracas installed price ceilings 
on thousands of different goods. Price ceilings typically cause shortages in 
two ways. With limited room for profit, producers will begin to make less 
of that product, prompting a supply shortage. Furthermore, artificially 
low prices often prompt hoarding and create parallel black markets. Ven-
ezuela has not been able to escape from the negative impacts of price ceil-
ings. The country is currently experiencing food shortages and is in the 
midst of what many would consider to be a state of emergency: "Soldiers 
have been deployed to raid private homes for food stores. Long lines regu-
larly form on streets for basic commodities."49
Debt and Inefficiency
One of the largest problems associated with PDVSA's social agenda is that 
the company has failed to invest in its own future. Despite a massive oil 
boom from 2004–2008 in which Venezuela exported nearly three billion 
barrels, PDVSA's debt increased from $3.7 billion to $19 billion dollars. 
Between 2010–2011, operating costs rose from $11.8 billion to $15.3 bil-
lion in the face of declining infrastructure.50 The total cost for each barrel 
has more than doubled, going from $13 in 2001 to $29 in 2008.51 Fur-
thermore, "analysts say PDVSA's debt profile is worrying given upcoming 
maturing bonds and the need for multibillion dollars of investments in 
the extra heavy crude Orinoco Belt to boost national production in com-
ing years."52 Debt aside, another sign of growing inefficiency has been the 
rise of employees despite decreasing production. Since Chavez fired 
18,000 employees in 2003, the official payroll of the company has 
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increased from 30,000 to 80,000 employees.53 However, during this 
time oil production has gone from 2.85 to 2.47 million barrels per day, a 
13 percent decline.54
Another financial issue that plagues PDVSA is Venezuela's trade policy. 
Nearly 300,000 barrels a day, well over 10 percent of total production, are 
sold to Caribbean and Central American nations at a discount in order to 
secure political backing. These discounts, as well as a subsidy on domestic 
gas that allows the fuel to be sold for six cents/gallon, have significantly 
blunted the growth of the company's coffers.55 Venezuela will need to 
begin pumping heavy crude from the Orinoco Tar Sands in the coming 
years if it wishes to maintain its current output. This will require billions 
of dollars in infrastructure investment and a great deal of technical know-
how, neither of which the company currently possesses, and it will need to 
look for abroad in an environment not entirely eager to invest in 
Venezuela.
While Chavez has made it clear that he wishes to diversify oil exports and 
decrease the role that the United States has as a trade partner, he has yet 
to come up with a serious alternative. The Venezuelan President has 
repeatedly said that he wishes to increase oil trade with China, but this 
appears an unrealistic venture. China has limited refinery capacity, lim-
ited access to petroleum due to its proximity to Russia and Central Asia, 
and brings with it prohibitively high transportation costs of moving oil 
around the Strait of Magellan or Cape Horn.
High oil prices actually threaten to hurt Venezuela's market share in the 
global oil industry. These high prices allow for petroleum to be produced 
from sources once considered financially prohibitive. Canadian tar sands 
and Brazilian offshore pre-salt oil deposits were once thought too costly to 
make exploration and production worthwhile. However, oil prices hover-
ing near $100 per barrel make these operations economically viable and 
may hurt Venezuela in the long run.
Conclusion
This article has dispelled the traditional economic theory that frames the 
resource curse as the primary cause of instability in Venezuela. The 
resource curse is not the cause of instability, but rather it is a result of 
structural problems within the nation. These problems include the mis-
guided economic and political policies of the Chavez government as well 
as the deterioration of the state oil company.
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Theorists such as Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal have shown 
through their research on CIS nations that ownership structure plays a 
significant role in the health of resource-dependent nations. CIS states 
that relied on a public ownership composition resulted in inefficient oil 
sector as well as zealous spending programs and the inability to weather 
commodity price swings. Venezuela, home to a state-owned oil sector, 
displays many of the problematic traits that Luong and Weinthal outline.
Ill-advised economic and political policies have left Venezuela in a 
precarious position. High commodity prices resulted in currency 
appreciation and the subsequent corrosion of the country's non-oil 
industries. What was once a nation that relied on manufactured and 
agricultural goods for export revenue is now forced to import most of its 
finished goods and food as a result of Dutch Disease. This could have been 
avoided had the Chavez regime used prudent economic policies, most 
notably a sovereign wealth fund. Chavez has chosen to freely use resource 
rents rather than use SWFs and other pragmatic economic solutions. This 
has spawned an asymmetrical political system in which the president and 
his party have an unfair advantage over the opposition. Chavez uses oil 
revenues to campaign for office and promote cronyism. If his opponents 
wish to enjoy the spoils of the oil revenues, these groups are forced to join 
his political movement or remain on the political fringe with the rest of 
the Chavez opposition.
The deterioration of PDVSA has played an equally important role in the 
instability witnessed today in Venezuela. The oil company has experi-
enced a vast "drain brain" and is being forced to spend revenues on social 
programs rather than reinvestment into company infrastructure. These 
social programs show some gains, though critics claim that these gains 
are merely superficial and fail to address the structural inequalities within 
the nation. Unfortunately, PDVSA's rising inefficiency and debt threaten 
to permanently cripple Venezuela's oil economy. Without this commod-
ity, the country has little to fall back on and what little gains were made 
during the Chavez Administration will become undone.
The findings in this article will be applicable in future analyses of 
resource-reliant countries. Governments play an incredibly important 
role in a country's response to resource wealth. A political system with 
adequate checks, balances, and transparency helps ensure that resource 
wealth is appropriately handled. Alternatively, resource abundance in a 
country with an asymmetrical power distribution often begets the misap-
propriation of wealth and the rise of cronyism. Hopefully, resource rich 
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nations can learn from the mistake of Venezuela in order to help mitigate 
the role that the poor economic policies and misguided individual leaders 
can play when it comes to a country's resource wealth.
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